THESE PAPERS ARE DRAFTS. SOME I AM STILL REWORKING OR TINKERING WITH, OTHERS ARE MORE DEVELOPED AND HAVE BEEN TEMPORARILY SIDELINED UNTIL I HAVE TIME TO FIND THEM A HOME. PLEASE DO NOT CITE, SHARE, OR QUOTE FROM THEM WITHOUT MY PERMISSION.
HOWEVER, CONSTRUCTIVE FEEDBACK IS ALWAYS WELCOME.
Philosophy of Science & Epistemology
In this paper I argue against various realist conceptions of species, and defend species concepts based on similarities. A version of this paper was presented at the 11th Annual INPC, and it will be published with revisions in the forthcoming Carving Nature at its Joints: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy Vol. 8 (MIT).
I demonstrate that there is a third alternative to naturalism and apriorism among approaches to first philosophy and the relationship between it and the sciences. I trace the origins of the bifurcation of philosophy into these two approaches back to Hume and Kant and common assumptions they hold about the per se uncertainty of empirical knowledge. The alternative that I propose is loosely based on Aristotle's epistemology and philosophy of science. It holds that a certain sphere of fundamental philosophical truths can be acquired from experience and held with unrevisable certainty. I conclude by outlining the challenges that such a view must overcome. A shortened version of this paper was to be given in absentia for me at the 5th Ghentian Conference in the Philosophy of Science, ‘Induction: Historical and Contemporary Approaches.'
Here I diagnose the modest 'connective analysis' advocated by Strawson and Stroud in the wake of the latter's proof that transcendental arguments can only generate metaphysical conclusions on the assumption of strong, anti-realist metaphysical assumptions. I go further and claim that even a merely descriptive analysis of the connections between our concepts and cognitive faculties will yield only historically contingent results, unless validatory metaphysics (realist or idealist) is used to bulwark claims to the stability of our conceptual schemes.
If, as I argue, transcendental arguments' effectiveness presupposes anti-realist metaphysics, then realist metaphysical systems will not be able to effectively utilize them. Indeed, I argue that methodologically realist systems must start presuppose some degree of foundationalism. I use Aristotle's treatment of the Principle of Non-contradiction in Metaphysics Γ as a case-study for these points. (This is also an Aristotle Paper)
Ancient Philosophy
The Principles of the Stoics, God and Matter, were considered by them to be bodies. The textual evidence for this cannot be doubted. However, this position makes their account of the incorporeality of space and void, indeed their distinction between body and space itself, incoherent.
This paper reevaluates the intimate relationship between Cosmic Intellect and the World-soul in Plato's Philebus. A crucial passage has for a long time been misread such as to suggest that cosmic intellect creates (and is therefore prior to and separate from) the World-soul. On the contrary, Plato is actually saying that Cosmic Intellect exists only in the World-soul and that this World-soul creates or distributes our mortal souls. This difference is crucial for our reception of the Timaeus and Plato's theology-cosmology more generally. I recently presented a slightly shorter version of this paper at the VIII triennial symposium of the International Plato Society.
A brief account of the Neoplatonist's account of Infinite number. Herein, we see Plotinus struggle with two opposed impulses: Forms (hence numbers) must be delimited, insofar as they are true, intelligible Beings; but as there is an infinite number of numbers, the Forms must be 'indefinite' or 'unlimited' as well. This paper discusses his attempted solution to this dilemma. A shortened version of this paper was presented at the 6th Annual meeting of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies.
- Current Work on Plato